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ABSTRACT
Objective: Despite the availability of palliative care in many countries, legalization of
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (EAS) continues to be debated—particularly around
ethical and legal issues—and the surrounding controversy shows no signs of abating.
Responding to EAS requests is considered one of the most difficult healthcare responsibilities.
In the present paper, we highlight some of the less frequently discussed practical implications
for palliative care provision if EAS were to be legalized. Our aim was not to take an explicit anti-
EAS stance or expand on findings from systematic reviews or philosophical and ethico-legal
treatises, but rather to offer clinical perspectives and the potential pragmatic implications of
legalized EAS for palliative care provision, patients and families, healthcare professionals, and
the broader community.
Method: We provide insights from our multidisciplinary clinical experience, coupled with
those from various jurisdictions where EAS is, or has been, legalized.
Results: We believe that these issues, many of which are encountered at the bedside, must be
considered in detail so that the pragmatic implications of EAS can be comprehensively
considered.
Significance of Results: Increased resources and effort must be directed toward training,
research, community engagement, and ensuring adequate resourcing for palliative care before
further consideration is given to allocating resources for legalizing euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide.
KEYWORDS: Euthanasia, Physician-assisted suicide, Legalization
INTRODUCTION
Palliative care offered by a multidisciplinary team is
intended to improve the quality of life of patients di-
agnosed with an incurable life-limiting illness and
their families (Palliative Care Australia, 2005).
Open discussion of death’s inevitability and acknowl-
edgment that dying is a normal process are key
elements of palliative care (World Health Organiza-
tion, 2002; Palliative Care Australia, 2011a,b).
Despite the availability of palliative care within Aus-
tralia and in many other countries, legalization of
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euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (EAS)
(Dees et al., 2013) continues to be debated (Macleod
et al., 2012), particularly around ethical and legal is-
sues (Pellegrino, 2001), a controversy that shows no
sign of diminishing (Hendry et al., 2013).
Palliative care cannot fully relieve all people’s suf-
fering, and even with the availability of optimal pal-
liative care it is likely that EAS will continue to be
sought by some. We seek to highlight some of the
less frequently discussed practical implications for
palliative care provision and, more broadly, if EAS
were to be legalized in Australia. Our arguments
and concerns are based on our collective longstand-
ing clinical experience in palliative care medicine,
nursing, specialist psychiatry, and geriatrics, and
are considered in the context of published insights
from various jurisdictions where EAS is legalized
and/or tolerated. Our aim is not to take an explicit
anti-EAS stance or expand on findings from system-
atic reviews or philosophical and ethico-legal treatis-
es (Hendry et al., 2013), but rather to offer clinical
perspectives and the potential implications of legal-
ized EAS for patients and families, healthcare profes-
sionals, and the broader community.
Responding to EAS requests is considered to be
one of the most difficult healthcare responsibilities
(Dees et al., 2013). Our thesis is that what is intended
in legislation to assist a small group of patients may
have a more generalized effect on the way end-of-life
care is perceived. It will inevitably have pragmatic
consequences for palliative care and for healthcare
more broadly, ones that have hitherto not been com-
prehensively considered. Pertinent points are illus-
trated by brief vignettes.
Implications for Patients and Families
A number of serious misconceptions are evident re-
garding the goal and intention of the treatments em-
ployed in palliative care. In clinical practice, the
belief by patients and relatives that some medica-
tions, particularly opioids, are used for hastening
death rather than for symptom relief, is frequently
encountered (Reid et al., 2008). This mistaken belief
is also held by some clinicians less experienced in pal-
liative care (Kwon, 2014). Hence, they may view es-
sential end-of-life symptom management, such as
opioids for pain relief, as euthanasia (White et al.,
2011), exemplified by the following cases:
In a busy hospital palliative care consultative
service, there are daily discussions with patients,
often elderly, who are fearful of opioids precipitat-
ing their death. On this day, an 82-year-old Greek
man with newly diagnosed pancreatic cancer is
concerned that the low dose of morphine pre-
scribed for pain relief will result in his premature
death. A great deal of time and reassurance is
given, yet still he remains uneasy and reluctant
to take effective analgesia.
The wife of a man with respiratory distress from
end-stage chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
refuses to let her husband have low-dose oral mor-
phine despite him finding it effective the previous
day. She explains that a strong Catholic faith pre-
cludes him from having euthanasia.
In a context where EAS is condoned, such fear may
increase, and the possibility of forgoing analgesia or
other symptom relief would be a potential outcome.
Though evidence of this is not apparent where EAS
is currently tolerated, the impact should continue
to be evaluated. Further, the consequences for the
doctor/patient relationship should be carefully
monitored; it is possible that the trust inherent in
this relationship, particularly in end-of-life care
(Steinhauser et al., 2000), may be eroded were physi-
cians permitted by law to offer EAS (White & Will-
mott, 2012). We strongly advocate further research
in this area.
It is also apparent that patients and their relatives
have many misconceptions about what dying in-
volves, and this may influence their views regarding
EAS. It seems that the overwhelming majority of me-
dia attention about the end of life and terminal ill-
ness focuses on conceptions that dying is inherently
painful, undignified, and traumatic for both patient
and family. In reality, this is simply untrue. We
have witnessed thousands of deaths where, in the
lead-up, the patient has been comfortable, able to
communicate their wishes, and say farewells, and
families have commented on how peaceful the death
was. In addition, many family carers seem to derive
personal growth and identify positive aspects associ-
ated with their caregiving role (Hudson, 2004; Wong
et al., 2009). Although as palliative care specialists
we cannot claim that every patient can be guaran-
teed a peaceful death, a more nuanced view is
strongly needed; otherwise, misconceptions about
dying may fuel people’s wish to secure control over
the circumstances of their death. The often-
misplaced view that intensification of treatment is
inevitable as death nears, involving intrusive medi-
cal intervention and machinery, seems widespread
among the broader community (Rubeli, 2012).
Patients clearly indicate that factors such as clear
communication, symptom control, and time to pre-
pare for death are important at the end of life, rather
than a focus upon intensive life prolongation (Stein-
hauser et al., 2000).
The current misconception of dying, as occurring
within a highly technological environment and
Hudson et al.1400
inevitably taken out of the patients’ hands, leads
some to advocate for EAS:
An elderly man, [with] a prominent local identity,
was admitted to hospital with heart failure. He re-
fused all medications and asked for euthanasia. Af-
ter exploration of his concerns, he revealed that he
did not wish to have his life prolonged, did not wish
to die in hospital, nor in intensive care. He agreed
that symptom control measures were consistent
with his wishes, and following institution of diuret-
ics and rate-control drugs, as well as community
supports, he returned home. There he held a
“wake” party, and died three weeks later with his
family and friends around.
The development of advance-care directives and in-
volvement of family in discussion around wishes for
treatment may substantially assist in addressing
concerns regarding a “medicalized” death over which
the patient has no control (Detering et al., 2010;
Mack et al., 2012). Some fear losing control of circum-
stances, others may fear being alone in facing death,
and some are concerned about dependence on others
(Kelly & Varghese, 1996; Oldham et al., 2011). Eu-
thanasia may be seen as a solution to being a burden
on the family (George et al., 2005; Pereira, 2011), ex-
emplified in this scenario:
An elderly woman was afraid of being a burden to
her adult daughter, knowing that her daughter
would need to take leave from work to care for
her. This fear led her to express a desire to “end
it all.”
While one patient may focus on the perceived incon-
venience to her family (which may be very consider-
able, though it may also be willingly shouldered)
and choose to seek a hastened death or forego life-
sustaining treatment as an alternative, another
may acknowledge the potential benefits that may
emerge within a relationship that involves permis-
sion to care and permission to be cared for. Such a
response recognizes that caring may provide mutual
benefits within a relationship and can, for some, en-
hance growth for those involved. Still others may re-
spond to the burden of care as a shared response and
seek additional support. For these patients, knowing
that their family can receive education, information,
respite, and other practical assistance may lessen the
perception of burden (Hudson et al., 2012). For many
families, these opportunities for support are not cur-
rently available, and the burden is not always ame-
liorated (Hudson & Payne, 2011).
In summary, there are many misconceptions and
misguided fears about the end of life. Fear can be a
bad counselor (Hertogh et al., 2007); accordingly, re-
sources should be directed toward rectifying misun-
derstandings among health professionals and the
broader community. Fear is also associated with inac-
curate perceptions of what palliative care is and what
it can offer. In the words of one palliative care pio-
neer, “there are currently more than fifty different
definitions of palliative care; no wonder that the pub-
lic and healthcare professionals are confused” (Doyle,
2003). We acknowledge that, if comprehensively out-
lined and fully explained in an unbiased manner,
then implementation of EAS may assist in clarifying
the boundaries of palliative care.
Implications for Healthcare Professionals
Meeting the Criteria for EAS
In some jurisdictions where EAS is legal or tolerated,
a necessary criterion is the presence of unbearable
suffering. How “unbearable” is defined and what its
relationship may be to the skills of the person tasked
with ameliorating the suffering deserves consider-
ation. According to the Dutch law on EAS, unbear-
able suffering is not a technical term, nor should it
be medicalized. “Unbearable” refers to a subjective
evaluation by the patient, given their prospects, their
views on a good death, and consideration of the op-
tions that are available to them as alternatives to
EAS. It is the responsibility of the physician to discuss
all these options (including palliative care) with the
patient before arriving at the joint conclusion that
there are, from the patient’s perspective, no feasible
alternatives (Hertogh, de Boer et al. 2007).
We acknowledge that physicians’ skills in caring
for those with advanced illness vary greatly. Some
doctors readily engage in discussions around treat-
ment limits and end-of- life care; they have knowl-
edge of, and interest in, providing expert symptom
relief and are skilled at exploring complex issues of
psychological, social, and spiritual importance for a
person facing the end of life. Others feel less confi-
dent and comfortable doing so. Studies have found
that some physicians tend to focus on the physical as-
pects of end-of-life care, while patients and families
want a broader spiritual, psychological, and social fo-
cus drawn from their life experience (Steinhauser
et al., 2000; Kelly et al., 2004). The lack of willingness
to engage around these concerns, and perhaps the
lack of ability to determine the limits of their own
skills, may lead some doctors to suggest that there
is nothing that can be done. That is, the physician
who is inexperienced with pain and symptom man-
agement or uncomfortable with discussing existen-
tial concerns may more readily agree that the
suffering is “unbearable” or arrive at the conclusion
that the patient’s symptoms are refractory (Kelly
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et al., 2004). In such circumstances, EAS may appear
to be the logical option for both patient and doctor.
Yet the same suffering may be effectively addressed
by the care of a more experienced colleague:
An elderly patient with advanced cervical cancer
was frequently incontinent of feces, due to a fistula
between her bowel and vagina. She was deeply
ashamed, remained at home and shunned visitors
because of the odor and difficulty managing incon-
tinence pads. She sought euthanasia from her doc-
tor, who agreed her life was miserable, and began
preparations. In the course of these “preparations,”
the patient was reviewed by a physician who sug-
gested she consider surgical diversion of her bowel
via a colostomy and additional psychosocial sup-
ports. After extensive discussion, she proceeded
to surgery, learned how to manage stoma bags,
and had three more months of life at home, when
she reengaged with her family and friends. She
died of metastatic disease, no longer incontinent.
Decision making may also be compounded by the
doctor’s own response to suffering, their capacity to
tolerate patients’ suffering, and their ability to iden-
tify when psychological intervention is needed (Kelly
et al., 2004). In Oregon, where unrelieved suffering is
not a requirement for EAS, those who assist with the
patient’s request are not required to have advanced
clinical expertise in relieving physical or psycho-
logical suffering (Hendin & Foley, 2008). In such in-
stances, the underlying reasons for the request can
be overlooked. Even when psychiatrists are involved,
their capacity to confidently assess the existence and
role of mental illness in EAS has been questioned
(Levene & Parker, 2011). Assessing mental capacity,
a common requirement for jurisdictions where eu-
thanasia and physician-assisted suicide are legal-
ized, can also be problematic for doctors (Price
et al., 2014).
Recognition of the final phase of life is notoriously
difficult to diagnose, and errors in prognostication
are common (Glare et al., 2008). In some instances
where EAS is legalized, there is a requirement that
the patient be expected to die within six months (Or-
egon Health Authority, 2014a); however, estimations
of life expectancy are typically erroneous (Frost et al.,
2014), particularly in the context of such chronic dis-
eases as dementia (Volicer, 2008). It is also common
in EAS legislation to ensure that a second medical
opinion be obtained (Frost et al., 2014). Currently
in Australia and many other countries, the over-
whelming majority of patients with a life-threaten-
ing illness are not seen by a specialist palliative
care physician (Johnson et al., 2011; Davies et al.,
2014). Hence, ensuring that patients requesting
EAS are seen by two doctors has major resource im-
plications that do not seem to have been comprehen-
sively considered in EAS deliberations.
Healthcare Professionals’ Misconceptions About
Limitation of Treatment and EAS
It is not only patients who are confused about the na-
ture and cause of dying—so are some doctors and oth-
er health professionals. A concern that treatment
withdrawal is actually synonymous with euthanasia
is at the root of some physicians’ decisions to insti-
tute, escalate, and continue providing medical inter-
ventions even when they are of limited benefit
(Goldstein et al., 2012). Confusion about what consti-
tutes limitations or reductions of treatment; misun-
derstanding about comprehensive symptom control
such as the use of opioids or sedation (Anquinet
et al., 2013); and lack of clarity about the meaning
of euthanasia can influence decisions. The following
scenario further exemplifies this concern:
A man with end-stage respiratory disease and re-
nal failure for which he was on dialysis stated his
preferences for relief of dyspnea, including, after
extensive discussion, his wish to receive opioids
and to cease dialysis. The opioids proved effective,
but his renal physician insisted he continue dialy-
sis, challenging the use of opioids for dyspnea since
“using opioids and ceasing dialysis were a form of
euthanasia.”
Such confusion has the potential to cause one to mis-
construe the goals of care. Some have claimed that
doctors are already practicing euthanasia but with-
out scrutiny (Kuhse et al., 1997; White & Willmott,
2012). The argument follows that current practices
should be legitimized and made transparent through
a relevant legislative framework. However, there is
confusion, as some equate “the cessation of treatment
or decisions not to treat when a person is dying . . .
with giving a lethal injection to end a life” (Ashby,
1997). Such confusion does not take into account
the irreversibility of the underlying condition, the po-
tential for treatment futility given the clinical cir-
cumstances, and the safety of, for example, opioids
as analgesics, even in high doses, when prescribed
according to best palliative care practice. There is
no evidence, when drugs are titrated carefully to ach-
ieve analgesia or symptom control, that life is short-
ened as a result. In fact, effective pain relief can
actually prolong life by ensuring that patients do
not die from the exhaustion associated with uncon-
trolled pain (Finlay, 2009).
Physicians may be reluctant to institute limits
around medical treatments and symptom relief
Hudson et al.1402
measures if they believe such practice is equivalent
to EAS. Nevertheless, a decision to cease such life-
sustaining treatment as dialysis requires thorough
assessment of all contributing factors (Bostwick &
Cohen, 2009). The pragmatic distinction between
ceasing treatment, instituting symptom relief mea-
sures (including sedation for refractory symptoms),
and euthanasia is very clear—if the objective is ach-
ieved (namely, the burdensome treatment is ceased
or the troublesome symptom relieved), that is where
it stops. It appears that education is required to dis-
tinguish good medical decision making from an in-
tention to end life (Finlay, 2009). We recognize that
advocates of legalization of EAS may contend that
greater clarity might ensue if EAS were to be imple-
mented.
Who Would Be Responsible for Performing EAS
and What Would This Imply?
Who would be the individuals or groups of healthcare
professionals charged with the responsibility for en-
abling and enacting EAS? What training, supervi-
sion, scrutiny, and reporting of effective practice
would be required for those teaching medical, nurs-
ing, and allied health students? How would this af-
fect the training of clinicians in the care of
seriously ill patients when it is already acknowledged
that current health professionals’ training does not
adequately equip them for these roles (Noone, 2012)?
Distressing conditions such as depression affect-
ing patients and their relatives are often unrecog-
nized and so go untreated (Rayner et al., 2011;
Mitchell, 2013). Skills in addressing the emotional,
information, and support needs of patients are also
lacking (Botti et al., 2006; Dilworth et al., 2014).
What skills would be required in the context
of EAS? Would health professionals be required to
perform EAS before graduating? (Somerville, 2011).
Would graduates potentially become desensitized?
(Hendin & Foley, 2008).
Responding to a request for EAS requires exqui-
site skills, judicious timing, and the capacity to enga-
ge in shared decision making. Without this confident,
competent clinical judgment, the physician can never
be satisfied that there really is no other reasonable
solution for a patient’s suffering (Hertogh et al.,
2007; Snijdewind et al., 2014). These skills are nei-
ther commonplace nor included in existing curricula
(Dees et al., 2013). In The Netherlands, the practice
of EAS is not part of medical training and has ambig-
uous status: EAS is not considered “normal medical
practice,” but “extraordinary end-of-life care” en-
trusted—by law—to physicians.
Accordingly, if EAS were legalized, a wide-ranging
review of all associated education curricula would be
needed. Boudreau (2011) takes the discussion fur-
ther by asking whether a new discipline—“euthanat-
rics”— would of necessity arise.
What would be the nature of the assistance re-
quired in EAS? Doctors may be required by their per-
sonal ethical codes not to render assistance, even if
the patient requests it. The important pragmatic is-
sue here is whether certain roles would be prescribed
within the EAS legislation, directing doctors how to
respond to such a request (Kelly et al., 2004).
It is apparent that responding to requests for EAS
has been difficult for some physicians who have felt
unprepared and lacking in experience, especially
when they did not know the patients very well
(Dobscha et al., 2004; Hicks, 2006). Others (mainly
General Practitioners) have felt unwilling to admin-
ister a lethal dose of medication, indicating that pa-
tients’ access to a physician willing to respond to
their request may be arbitrary (Sercu et al., 2012).
Participating doctors in EAS found that it required
a significant investment of time and was emotionally
intense (Deschepper et al., 2014).
Some have argued that the impact of legalizing
EAS will have dramatic effects on how medicine is
perceived. Middleton (2012), for example, contends
that to fundamentally change the role of the doctor
as one who supports life to one who takes life will
have profound, unpredictable effects on the percep-
tion and practice of medicine. This warrants further
research. Still others have suggested that EAS is not
necessarily the domain of medicine. Although legal
requirements in most jurisdictions allowing EAS
specify the physician’s role, nurses in Switzerland
are allowed to assist, and the physicians are not al-
ways present (Inghelbrecht et al., 2010). Some argue
that administering a lethal medication does not nec-
essarily require medical training (Randall & Downie,
2010), while others assert that EAS needs to be med-
icalized as part of professional practice to ensure that
the death is rapid and painless (Salem, 1999).
In a proposal from The Netherlands, supported by
the Dutch Euthanasia Society and Society for Old
Age Rational Suicide in the United Kingdom, assis-
tance for “self-chosen death of the elderly” would be
provided by counselors, removing it from the medical
domain because it is an “existential problem” (Beek-
man, 2011). Meanwhile, in Oregon, a case has been
made that assisted dying “need not be physician-as-
sisted,” thereby freeing doctors to focus on high-qual-
ity palliative care (Prokopetz & Lehmann, 2012). It
seems that some doctors continue to be reluctant to
perform euthanasia; so help is offered to those whose
“normal doctor” will not carry out the procedure
(Patterson, 2012).
These issues highlight important questions that
have largely been neglected about the potential
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impact on practitioners if the move to uphold self-de-
termined and self-controlled death by way of condon-
ing EAS were to be supported (Hertogh et al., 2007).
The Issue of How Palliative Care and EAS
Would “Interact”
In the Northern Territory of Australia, where eutha-
nasia was enacted from 1996 to 1997 (via the Rights
of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (NT)), guidelines re-
quired a palliative care consultation before a pa-
tient’s request for euthanasia could be considered
(Kissane et al., 1998). This potentially posed a con-
siderable challenge for any palliative care physician
responding to such a request. The goals of palliative
care—including symptom relief, family support, as-
sistance with decision making, and enhancing quali-
ty of life—are accomplished over time and within the
context of supportive relationships. Through consul-
tation with all members of the multidisciplinary
team, patients and families are more likely to be ad-
equately prepared to explore the psychological as
well as physical symptoms. Multidisciplinary sup-
port replaces a “one-off” consultation, a salutary re-
minder that “quality end-of-life care is a dynamic
process that is negotiated and renegotiated,” and
takes time (Steinhauser et al., 2000). In the Northern
Territory, pressured by the new legislation and with
the community’s acquiescence, it seemed that a quick
response was required, compromising opportunities
for exploring the dying patient’s psychosocial distress
and suffering. All the tasks of palliative care were to
be compressed (purportedly) into a single consulta-
tion—a seemingly impossible task, and not reflective
of good practice. If EAS were to be legalized, it could
potentially reduce the palliative care physician’s role
to mere tokenism in order to satisfy a patient’s re-
quest to address a formality. Other deficiencies of
this legislative approach were highlighted by the lim-
ited assessment and management of depression in
the Northern Territory cases cited above (Kissane
et al., 1998).
Should EAS be legalized, palliative care teams
may need to determine whether and how it would
be delivered within their services. If a particular pal-
liative care service decided not to practice EAS, then
decisions around referral pathways, the pragmatics
for those patients too ill to travel to seek an alterna-
tive medical opinion, and many other considerations
would require negotiation and potential additional
resources.
The ethics of conscientious objection in medicine
and nursing would also require careful discussion,
recognizing that there may be differing views within
the multidisciplinary team. If conscientious objec-
tion is considered a right for all health professionals,
would this be automatically available in the context
of EAS? While a full discussion on this issue is not
possible here, it is important to note at least one dis-
tinctive view. Savulescu asserts that “doctors who
compromise the delivery of medical services to pa-
tients on conscience grounds must be punished”
(Savulescu, 2006). As well as erosion of trust in the
doctor–patient relationship, trust between col-
leagues may also be compromised should the issue
of conscientious objection be available but viewed dif-
ferently within a therapeutic team. Furthermore, it
may be difficult to distinguish between an EAS re-
quest that the doctor—all things considered—judges
to be unjustified, and their conscientious objection.
The Community Implications
Community discussion of EAS has profound implica-
tions for palliative care when the latter is frequently
identified as an antidote to EAS and therefore in op-
position to euthanasia. Palliative care and euthana-
sia are perceived as responses to the same problem;
that is, the suffering associated with dying. But one
of the implications of legalizing EAS is that patients
may feel compelled to choose whether they engage
with palliative care or EAS.
If we truly want to advance the debate on EAS in
more cogent and less emotional terms, palliative
care needs to be accessible to all, without conditions.
Hence, the challenge for palliative care is a public-
health one—to focus the debate on optimum care
for people who are dying. Accordingly, if people
wish to pursue EAS, this should not preclude their
access to all that palliative care has to offer.
In the media discourse of people requesting EAS,
it is sometimes claimed that the patient has “tried
palliative care,” the assumption being that EAS is
the only alternative solution in response to such un-
relieved suffering. In contrast to the palliative care
team approach, well-meaning general physicians
are too frequently ill equipped to address this suffer-
ing (Steinhauser et al., 2000). Acknowledging the
profound and multifaceted nature of suffering in
some situations, we believe that the broader commu-
nity needs to be reassured of palliative care’s signifi-
cant role in attempting to relieve all aspects of
suffering. Unrelieved distress is considered a pallia-
tive care emergency, prompting immediate attention
(Palliative Care Expert Group, 2010). However, while
the multidisciplinary palliative care team utilizes all
their expertise and resources, they also acknowledge
that some aspects of pain and suffering cannot not be
completely ameliorated (Noble. 2013).
Despite the proven benefits of palliative care and
policy recommendations supporting its widespread
availability (de Lima et al., 2012), there is inequity
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and inconsistency in the provision of end-of-life care
in Australia (Palliative Care Australia, 2012) and in
many other countries (World Health Organization,
2014). While the overwhelming majority of healthy
Australians nominate home as their preferred place
to die, 52% actually die in hospital (Australian Co-
mmission on Safety and Quality in Health Care
(ACSQHC) 2013). There they frequently receive
high-cost interventions delivered contrary to best-
available evidence, and sometimes without fully in-
formed decision making from the individual and/or
their family carers (Palliative Care Australia,
2008). In this setting, disregarding the wishes of pa-
tients and their carers results in a high cost burden
for the health system and potentially a poorer quality
of death (Department of Health and Ageing, 2010).
The lack of equal access for people who require pal-
liative care is sobering, with Palliative Care Austra-
lia contending that it is “nothing short of a lottery,”
dependent on location, diagnosis, cultural back-
ground, age, and health professionals’ education
(Palliative Care Australia, 2011a,b). Meanwhile, in
the United Kingdom, hospice care has been referred
to as “heaven for a few” (Clark et al., 2005). Despite
government commitment and the dedication of
health professionals, carers, and volunteers, many
continue to miss out on appropriate end-of-life care.
Bereavement care (a core tenet of palliative care) is
also currently suboptimal, as is the availability of
palliative care in rural areas (Hudson, 2013).
Like most health issues, the reasons for these
anomalies are complex: inadequate funding, insuffi-
cient training of health professionals, lack of cultur-
ally appropriate resources and services, societal
unwillingness to accept and openly discuss dying,
and our rapidly aging population (Palliative Care
Australia, 2011a,b). It is also essential to make the
case for every person’s right to access adequate
pain relief and their right to refuse all medical treat-
ment, including artificial hydration and nutrition
(Hendin & Foley, 2008).
EAS requests are uncommon. Approximately
50,000 palliative care patients are admitted to Aus-
tralian hospitals each year (Palliative Care Austra-
lia, 2011a,b). Less than 1% of those with advanced
illness referred to hospital palliative care services
have a sustained desire for EAS (unpublished data,
JP). A prospective study in seven palliative care units
in France over a 6-month period similarly reported a
rather low frequency of requests for euthanasia (13 of
611 patients or 2.1%) (Comby & Filbert, 2005). Rates
are also low for people who have availed themselves
of EAS in jurisdictions where it is supported: 0.22%
per 10,000 deaths in Oregon and less than 2.8% of
all deaths in The Netherlands (Oregon Health Au-
thority, 2014b; Snijdewind et al., 2014). Despite these
low rates, requests and statements regarding a desire
to die and EAS need a competent and compassionate
response. While preliminary work on guidelines to
respond to desire-for-death requests has been under-
taken, training and research in this area is urgently
needed (Hudson et al., 2006).
Investment in palliative care is likely to have a
much greater population impact than investment in
facilitating widely available legal EAS. Given the
small numbers of people facing advanced illness
who actually desire EAS, it seems logical that prior-
ity be given to resource and policy perspectives neces-
sary for educating all health professionals about
palliative care rather than directing resources at
this time to giving legal status to EAS. Currently, pal-
liative care is not mandated in undergraduate curric-
ula, yet every healthcare professional will be
required to care for a dying patient and family. Un-
due emphasis on EAS is misplaced for the vast major-
ity of Australians facing a terminal illness, who
seemingly have a low interest in EAS and may cur-
rently miss out on the benefits of palliative care pro-
vision.
Legalizing EAS would have practical implications
for palliative care’s commitment to making such care
available for all Australians. For example, a focus on
establishing “networks of care that allow patients to
access appropriate and timely care consistent with
their level of need” (Department of Health and Age-
ing, 2005) has the potential to increase society’s con-
fidence in end-of-life care. Public attention directed
toward EAS at this point in time may detract from
this aim.
Networks of care include support for family carers,
whose needs for psychological care and relevant in-
formation are at present largely unmet (Hudson &
Payne, 2011). While the psychological outcomes of be-
reaved family members are better for those who ac-
cess palliative care services (Hudson & Payne,
2011), the outcomes for those family members of pa-
tients who have undergone EAS require much more
empirical inquiry (Ganzini et al., 2009; Wagner
et al., 2012). For example, higher instances of post-
traumatic distress disorder and depression in fami-
lies who have witnessed EAS have been reported
(Wagner et al., 2012). The longer-term impact on
health professionals remains largely unknown.
It is also apparent that the views of relatives/fam-
ily carers can influence doctors’ decision making in
response to EAS requests. This interface has been
largely overlooked, and the role that family carers
undertake in the process of EAS is underexplored
(Snijdewind et al., 2014).
The role of psychiatry in decision making for those
requesting to end their lives also needs increased
focus, including the need to ensure appropriate
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training in assessment (Macleod et al., 2012) and
therapeutic communication (Kelly et al., 2003).
Economic factors may become a very real issue. In
some instances in Oregon, health insurance covers
inexpensive lethal drugs for EAS, but not the costly
drugs used in palliative care. A routine letter is
sent to patients with a prognosis of around five years,
offering them full payment for “assisted suicide (eu-
phemistically categorized as ‘comfort care,’ thereby
further blurring the boundaries between palliative
care and EAS)” (Marker, 2008). Patients who choose
EAS to avoid being a burden on carers may be influ-
enced by the cost of care, and palliative care special-
ists would be obliged to discuss these options.
In contemporary healthcare, before implementing
any new initiative, it is expected that a suitable evi-
dence base be ensured and that associated costs
and ongoing evaluation factored in, criteria that
seem to be unmet in relation to EAS. Consideration
also needs to be given to the costs of comprehensive
monitoring and reporting of EAS (Hendin & Foley,
2008).
Awareness raising and capacity building pertain-
ing to these issues coincide with the aims of palliative
care, requiring urgent public-health changes to en-
able each person with a life-threatening illness, their
family, and carers to have access to well-resourced
quality palliative care (Australian Institute of Health
and Welfare, 2011). We need to promote natural
death, avoid unnecessarily prolonging the dying pro-
cess (Somerville, 2011), and base our practice on the
World Health Organization (WHO) (2002) definition
of palliative care, which affirms life, regards dying
as a normal process, and intends neither to hasten
nor postpone death.
CONCLUSIONS
The overwhelming majority of justifications for EAS
focus on the individual who desires this pathway,
while the potential impact on society, institutions,
and healthcare delivery have received far less atten-
tion (Somerville, 2011). We believe that most discus-
sion around EAS and its place in the care of those
with advanced illness is conducted in an environ-
ment far from the bedside, and removed from the ex-
periences of those with the illness, their carers, and
the palliative care health professionals who deliver
end-of-life care on a daily basis. In this paper, we
have provided insights from our experiences, coupled
with those from various jurisdictions where EAS is,
or was, legalized, to highlight what we believe are
pragmatic implications for palliative care services
should EAS be legalized in Australia. We believe
that these issues, many of which are encountered at
the bedside, must be considered in detail. Increased
resources and effort must be directed toward train-
ing, research, community engagement, and ensuring
adequate resourcing for palliative care to benefit
many before further consideration is given to allocat-
ing resources into legalizing EAS to respond to
the requests of a few.
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